PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STmcr

LIABILITY IN TORT-STRICT LIABIL-

ITY APPLICABLE IN INADEQUATE WARNING

CAsEs-Freund v. Cel-

lofilm Properties,Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
With the development of a strict liability theory in the area of

products liability, courts can more readily hold manufacturers liable
for manufacturing' and design 2 defects in the goods they produce and

for failing to give adequate warnings. 3 Because the terms used to
define strict liability in tort are borrowed from warranty 4 and negligence law, 5 courts have struggled with the issue of whether there is in

fact a difference between negligence and strict liability in cases involving design defects and inadquate warning. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey recently addressed this issue in Freund v. Cellofilm Pro-

perites, Inc.6
From March 25 until July 11, 1974, Elmer Freund was employed
as a maintenance worker by the Cellofilm corporation. 7 His work
frequently brought him in contact with nitrocellulose, a highly flam-

I See Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485 (1972) (action against automobile
maker for defective manufacture of steering and suspension mechanism); Kroeger v. Bowman,
411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967) (soft drink bottler and grocery store held strictly liable for injuries
sustained by customer when bottle fell from defectively manufactured carton).
- See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)
(manufacturer and rental agent of high-lift loader held strictly liable for design defect which
precipitated plaintiff's accident); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972)
(manufacturer held strictly liable for defective design of punch press).
See Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (case remanded
on issue of adequacy of warning label on paint can). It should be noted that some courts consider
design defects and inadequate warnings to be two distinct types of defects, see Mayberry v.
Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407, 412 (N.D. Okla. 1979), while other courts
include inadequate warnings in the category of design defects.
4 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The Suter
court's formulation of the principle of strict liability requires that at the time a seller markets a
product it must be "fit, suitable, and safe." Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149.
5 Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts includes the words "unreasonably
dangerous" in its definition of strict liability which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toirs § 402A (1965)
6 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
" Id. at 233, 432 A.2d at 927.
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mable component of paints and lacquers. 8 On July 11, plaintiff and
two co-workers were assigned to clean a chute which had been used to

dump liquid nitrocellulose into a mixer.9 One of the workers began
to sweep the nitrocellulose dust which had spilled around the mixer

when fire suddenly engulfed the entire area.' 0 Freund and a coworker suffered severe injuries."
Freund and his wife instituted an action against Hercules, Inc. in

the Superior Court of New Jersey.'

2

The dispute centered on the

13

exact cause of the fire and on the adequacy of the warnings issued by
Hercules.14 Plaintiff Elmer Freund admitted that he was aware of
the existence of the warning, although he had never read it.' 5 Plaintiffs expert conceded that this accident would not have happened if
the warning, which stated that nitrocellulose was highly flammable
and must be saturated with water in the event of a spill,' 8 had been
observed.' 7 The plant superintendent explained that this was the
cleanup procedure which employees were expected to follow.' 8
Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, plaintiffs requested
that the jury be charged on the issues of negligence, strict liability,

8 Id.
9 Id. at 234, 432 A.2d at 927. A shield had been placed around the mixer's hatch during the
dumping of the chemical to avoid spilling an excessive quantity of nitrocellulose which, in its dry
form, is even more flammable than in its liquid form. id.
10 Id.
I Id. Freund's co-worker died as a result of the accident while Freund suffered severe second
and third degree burns. Id. at 232, 432 A.2d at 927.
22 Id. at 233, 432 A.2d at 927. In the original action, plaintiffs also named the owner of the
site of the accident, Cellofilm Properties, Inc., and Freund's employer, Cellofilm Corp.. as
defendants. Both of these parties were dismissed from the action through motions in the trial
court. Id.
13 Id. at 234, 432 A.2d at 927. Plaintiff's expert pinned the origin of the fire on the
nitrocellulose dust cloud lighted by electrostatic effects. Defendant's experts testified that the fire
started when the vapors from the mixer ignited. Id.. 432 A.2d at 927-28.
" Id. at 234, 432 A.2d at 927. The warning read as follows:
Fire may result if container is punctured or severely damaged-Handle carefully-Do not drop or slide-Hazard increases if material is allowed to dry-Keep
container tightly closed when not in use-In case of spill or fire soak with waterFor further information refer to MCA Chemical Safety Data Sheet DS-96.
DANGER-FLAMMABLE

Id. at 235, 432 A.2d at 928.
Id. at 235, 432 A.2d at 928.
For example, in Freund the workers had been instructed to wet the nitrocellulose spills
before sweeping. At trial, plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the warning but had never
read it. Id.
17 Id.
"I Id. A poster distributed by Hercules and displayed in the employees' locker room gave
identical instructions. Id.
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and concurrent negligence.' 9 The trial court refused to give an instruction on strict liability, reasoning that a finding of the inadequacy
of the warning would automatically follow from a finding of the
defendant's negligence. 20 In addition, the court reasoned that a
charge of negligence adequately covered the issue of concurrent negligence, 2' thus concluding that an independent instruction on this issue
was unnecessary. 22 In a unanimous verdict, the jury found that
Hercules was not negligent. 23 After moving unsuccessfully for a new
trial, plaintiffs appealed. The appellate division affirmed the trial
court's decision without an opinion,2 4 and the Supreme Court of New
25
Jersey granted certification.
In Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., the Supreme Court of
New Jersey for the first time addressed the issue of whether a products
liability case concerning inadequate warnings should be considered
under a strict liability theory or a negligence theory. 26 To resolve this
issue and the question of whether the trial judge erred when he
instructed the jury only on the theory of negligence, 27 the court ap28
plied a three-step analysis. Justice Handler, writing for the majority,
explained the difference between negligence and strict liability in
inadequate warning cases, 29 defined the elements of an appropriate
charge to a jury,30 and compared the newly formulated charge with
that which the trial judge gave.3 ' On the basis of this analysis, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had been prejudiced by the deficient
charge and that a new trial was warranted.3 2 Because the case was to

Id.
'

Id. at 236, 432 A.2d at 928. The plaintiffs submitted a charge directing the jury to find the

manufacturer strictly liable if the inadequate warning rendered the product defective and

proximately caused injury. The proposed charge specified that "[piroof of the manufacturer's
negligence is not required." Id. at 235, 432 A.2d at 928. The court suggested that the charge was
incorrect in that an inadequate warning would "necessarily result" from the negligence of the
defendant. Id. at 236, 432 A.2d at 928.
,d.I

at 246, 432 A.2d at 933.

Id. at 236, 432 A.2d at 928.
23
"~

Id.
Id.

' Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 85 N.J. 453, 427 A.2d 555 (1980).
' 87 N.J. at 240, 432 A.2d at 930. In Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J.
150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), and Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816
(1978), the court applied the theory of strict liability in tort to design defects, whereas the
Freund court had to deal with the problem of an inadequate warning.

-7 87 N.J. at 2.36, 432 A.2d at 928.

Freund was a unanimous decision.
Id. at 2.36-41, 432 A.2d at 929-31.
I" at 241-43, 432 A.2d at 931-32.
Id.
, Id. at 243-45, 432 A.2d at 932-33.
Id.

3'
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be remanded, the court also addressed the secondary issue of concurrent negligence.3 3 The majority held that a trial judge should give a
when more than one tortseparate charge on concurrent negligence
34
feasor is involved in an accident.
In discussing what differentiated the negligence and strict liability theories of recovery for inadequate warning design defects, the
court analyzed the terminology used to describe those theories. 35 Justice Handler indicated that terms associated with negligence3 and
warranty 37 were often used to define strict liability and that this was
the primary reason for the confusion surrounding the negligence and
strict liability theories of recovery. 38 The court conceded that there
was no particularized language for the theory of strict liability in tort
and that the use of negligence terminology, therefore, could not be
avoided. 39 To illustrate how elusive the distinctions between the
different theories of recovery were, the court mentioned two jurisdictions which considered both concepts to be identical in the area of
inadequate warning. 40 The court clearly indicated, however, that

33 Id. at 245, 432 A.2d at 933.
14 Id. at 247, 432 A.2d at 934. Plaintiffs requested such a charge to counter the effect of
defendant's argument that Cellofilm, Inc. and the two workers assigned to the cleaning job with
Freund were responsible for the fire. Id. at 245, 432 A.2d at 933.
35 Id. at 236-41, 432 A.2d at 929-31.
38 A negligence theory was used by injured parties to recover against manufacturers before
the concept of strict liability was formulated. For a broad treatment of the law of negligence in
products liability, see Noel, Manufacturersof Products-The Drfit Toward Strict Liability, 24
TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957).
37 Because negligence on the part of the manufacturer or supplier was usually very difficult if
not impossible to prove, courts turned to the law of warranty to hold manufacturers strictly
liable. See Simpson v. Powered Prod., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963)
(lessee of faulty golf cart can sue retailer under breach of warranty theory); Thomas v. Leary. 15
A.D.2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962) (plaintiff injured when dental chair collapsed deemed to
have cause of action for breach of warranty).
3s 87 N.J. at 236-37, 432 A.2d at 929.
39 Id. at 237, 432 A.2d at 929.
40 Id. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969), plaintiffs vision was
permanently impaired after she used a prescription drug manufactured and sold by defendant
for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. Id. at 980. The court of appeals stated that both the
negligence and strict liability sections of the Second Restatement of Torts were applicable to this
case where the action was a "breach of the duty to give a proper (reasonable under the
circumstances) warning resulting in injury to appellee." Id. at 992. In Rainbow v. Albert Ela
Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 250, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1975), plaintiff sustained injuries while driving at
night on a road under construction. He first sought recovery on the basis of negligence, but later
amended his complaint and sued defendant for strict liability in tort. Id. at 251, 373 N.Y.S.2d at
929. The New York court decided that "[u]nder either theory, the recovery ultimately depends
upon a subjective determination by the trier of facts of what constitutes reasonable warning
under all circumstances." id. at 253, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 931. See also Skaggs v. Clairol Inc., 6 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 85 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1970) (additional instructions on strict liability unnecessary where
jury was fully instructed on negligence regarding labeling of hair dye).
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41
the recent trend favors distinguishing strict liability from negligence.
To distinguish these two concepts, the court examined the approach taken under each theory. 42 It noted that in negligence cases
43
the trier of fact must focus on the conduct of the manufacturer,
whereas in strict liability cases the court must focus on the product

itself."4 Relying upon the Oregon case of Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,45 the court examined the concept of dangerousness in the
context of strict liability. 46 The Phillips court, which recognized a
distinction between negligence and strict liability based on the con-

duct/product orientation dichotomy, stated that the dangerousness of
a product could be determined by imputing to the manufacturer the
knowledge of such propensity for harm and then deciding whether the
manufacturer acted negligently when he marketed his product without proper warning. 47 Noting that this definition of strict liability
seemed to include the issue of manufacturer conduct, the Freund
court acknowledged that the difference between the conduct and
product-oriented approaches was difficult to ascertain. 48 The court
explained that the ambiguity stemmed from the underlying risk-utility
theory in which a product's safety is determined by weighing its utility
against the risk inherent in its use. 49 Because the requirement of a
41 87 N.J. at 237, 432 A.2d at 929. Justice Handler cited several cases to this effect, including
Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co.,
268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1980); and Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976).
4- 87 N.J. at 238, 432 A.2d at 929.
43 Professor Wade stated: "'Theessential difference between an action in negligence and one
in strict liability (or breach of warranty) lies not in the condition of the product but in the
requirement in the negligence action of additional proof regarding the nature of the defendant's
conduct." Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 551,
553 (1980).
41 87 N.J. at 238, 432 A.2d at 929. In Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 449 F.2d 809

(9th Cir. 1974), the court stated that -flit is the unreasonableness of the condition of the product,
not of the conduct of the defendant, that creates liability." Id. at 812. In Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979), the court observed that the theory of
strict liability shifts the focus from the conduct of the manufacturer, as in negligence law, to the
inherent qualities of the product itself. Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149. See also Hamilton v. Hardy,
37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976) (plaintiff entitled to instructions on strict liability where
plaintiff suffered stroke allegedly caused by physician's negligent administration of birth control
pill and by manufacturer's failure to give adequate warning).
45269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Plaintiff was injured when a sheet of fiberboard was
regurgitated by the sanding machine which he was operating. Id. at 488, 525 P.2d at 1034.
4"87 N.J. at 238-39, 432 A.2d at 929-30.
'
269 Or. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039.
48 87 N.J. at 238, 432 A.2d at 930. In Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky.
1976), the Kentucky, Supreme Court arrived at a similar conclusion despite using the unreasonably dangerous standard of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. "'Although strict
liability does not depend upon negligence, a degree of kinship, between the two does inhere in
the term *unreasonably dangerous.' " Id. at 200.
41 87 N.J. at 239 n.1, 432 A.2d at 930 n.1. Professor Wade gave a list of factors that might be
considered in a risk-utility analysis:
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warning would rarely alter the utility of a product, a manufacturer
who failed to give the necessary warnings which would render his

product safe without affecting its utility could easily be found negli50
gent.
Despite the similarities between the concepts of negligence and
strict liability, the court found one real difference: "under strict liabilIn negligence cases, such
ity, the seller's knowledge is presumed ....
knowledge must be proved." 5' This basic distinction which has been
recognized as valid by commentators 52 was, for the Freundcourt, the
main substantive reason for finding the trial court's instructions deficient.5 3 The Freund court's survey of New Jersey law revealed that a
foundation for this principle had already been laid in the cases of
Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.5 1 and Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry and Machine Co. 55 In these cases the Supreme Court distinguished between manufacturing and design defects s" and imputed the
knowledge of the product's propensity for harm to manufacturers in
design defect cases.5 7 Noting the difference between negligence and
strict liability, the Freund court concluded that "in inadequate warning design defect cases, a strict liability charge should be given. "58
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the
product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973).
,0 87 N.J. at 238-39 n.1, 432 A.2d at 930 n.1.
5' Id. at 239, 432 A.2d at 930.
52 See Wade, supra note 49, at 834. See also Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacyof
Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 404-08 (1970).
51 87 N.J. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1979).
- 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1978).
58 76 N.J. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824.
-7 Id. at 171-72., 386 A.2d at 825.
-1 87 N.J. at 240-41, 432 A.2d at 931. In Shatz v. Tee Technical Adhesives, 174 N.J. Super.
135, 148-49, 415 A.2d 1188, 1195 (App. Div. 1980), the court similarly held that a strict liability
charge should be given in inadequate warning cases.
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Justice Handler supplied two reasons in support of this holding. The

first pertained to a fundamental concept in strict product liability 59 protection of the consumer. The second was "the need for uniformity
and consistency in products liability cases." 60 Because the court assumed that inadequate warnings were design defects, and because
strict liability charges are employed in defective design cases, it logically followed that the same kind of instructions should be given in
cases of inadequate warning.61
After concluding that strict liability applies in inadequate warning cases, the court discussed the elements of an appropriate
charge.6 2 The court relied upon Suter, where a distinction between
self-evident and non-self-evident defects had been made.63 In Freund
the court assumed that an inadequate warning was a non-self-evident
defect and thus required a charge including, at the very least, the
elements of proximate cause, reasonably foreseeability, and a specific
64
instruction on a duty to warn.
The Suter court rejected the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" language of section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts, 5 and stated that "the jury should be charged in terms of

whether the product was reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its
intended purposes." 681 In Freund the supreme court reiterated its
repudiation of the section 402A language noting that such language

" 87 N.J. at 240, 432 A.2d at 931. E.g., Creenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.2d
57, 6.3,
377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) ("The purpose of strict liability is to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves"); see Birnbaum, Unmarking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to
Warranty to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. RE'. 593, 596 (1980).
'O 87 N.J. at 240, 432 A.2d at 931.
Id. at 240 n.3, 432 A.2d at 931 n.3.
6'2 Id. at 241, 432 A.2d at 931.
" 81 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150. Self-evident defects seem to include manufacturing
defects and some design defects. Non-self-evident defects, which include some design defects
such as inadequate warnings, lack the above qualities and "'the question then becomes whether
the defendant was negligent to people who might be harmed by that condition if they came into
contact with it or were in the vicinity of it '"Id. (quoting Wade, supra note 49, at 835).
64 87 N.J. at 241, 432 A.2d at 931. It appears that the Freund court considered proximate
cause and reasonable foreseeablity to be normal elements of a jury charge in a non-self-evident
defect case. The explicit instruction on a duty to warn, however, was viewed as being peculiar to
inadequate warning cases. Id.
61 81 N.J. at 174-76, 406 A.2d at 152-53. See note 5 supra.
1" 81 N.J. at 176, 406 A.2d at 153. It should be noted that the language of section 402A was
accepted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 180, 386 A.2d at 829, and
was rejected by the same court one year later in Suter, 81 N.J. at 174-76, 406 A.2d at 152-53.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:639

could be interpreted by a jury as placing a double burden on the
plaintiff: that of showing a defect and that of proving that the defect
created an unreasonably dangerous condition. 67 The Freund majority emphasized that jury instructions should vary according to the type
of defect involved.68 The court maintained that safety was a more
appropriate means of determining the adequacy of a warning than
fitness or suitability which were related directly to the utility of a
product. 69 In any event, the court concluded that fitness and suitability were subsumed in safety and that "the charge in an inadequate
warning case, must focus on safety."' 70 After covering the different
elements of a charge, the court emphasized that at its most basic level
the charge must specify that the knowledge of the product's danger is
to be imputed to the product's manufacturer. 7' Furthermore, Justice
Handler more precisely defined the scope of the duty to warn. That
duty would extend to all foreseeable users 72 and attach without regard
to prevailing industry standards.73
Having established that a strict liability charge should be given
and having clarified the elements of the charge, the court compared
the proposed charge with the negligence instructions given by the trial
judge74 and concluded that the trial judge erred in a manner prejudi-

67 87 N.J. at 241-42, 432 A.2d at 931.
" Id. at 242, 432 A.2d at 931.
69 Id., 432 A.2d at 932.

7iId.
" Id. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
72 Id.
7- Id. This statement is consistent with the position the court took when industry standards
were used as a defense. See Cepeda, 76 N.J. at 161,386 A.2d at 820; Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp.,
60 N.J. 402, 411, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972).
"' 87 N.J. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932. By way of a footnote, the court highlighted the charge
presented to the jury at the trial level:
To recover, the party suing must establish that the the party being sued, whom
we call the defendant, was negligent and that this negligence was a proximate cause
of the happening of the accident. . . .By the term proximate cause the law means
that the negligent conduct of a defendant, the party being sued, must have been the
efficient producing cause of the damages claimed by the the parties suing who, of
course, we call the plaintiffs. The test you are going to apply in determining the issue
of negligence is whether or not the defendant exercised under the circumstances
involved, the time and place and so forth, the degree of care which a reasonably
prudent manufacturer of chemical products . . . would have exercised. If the party
exercised that care, then the defendant would not be liable. The manufacturer is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care in the production, packaging and labeling of
its product to protect those who may reasonably be expected to be in the area of the
use of the product from unreasonable risk of harm while it is being used for the
purpose it was intended. . . .This, of course, does not mean ever), conceivable risk.
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cial to plaintiff. 75 The court reasoned that the jury might have been
misled to believe that Hercules would have fulfilled its duty to warn
had it acted as most manufacturers would in similar circumstances,
and had it exercised due care in the formulation and display of the
warning.7 6 In addition, the court criticized the negligence charge
which was worded so as to encompass only intended uses rather than
all foreseeable uses. 77 The court also observed that the charge may
have put the burden of showing industry standards on the plaintiff, a
requirement which the court had already rejected. 78 Finally, the jury
was never specifically informed that knowledge of dangerousness is
imputed to the defendant. Thus, although Hercules had admitted
such knowledge, plaintiff was never formally relieved of this burden.7 8 For all these reasons the court decided that "the use of the
negligence charges was not a harmless error." 8 0
Having decided to remand the case, the court proceeded to address the issue of concurrent negligence."' This issue had been raised
by the plaintiff to counter Hercules' defense tht Cellofilm Inc. and
Freund's co-workers negligently caused the fire.8 2 The trial court
refused to instruct the jury on this theory,8 3 reasoning that the instruction on defendant's conduct being a proximate cause rather than the
proximate cause adequately covered the law. 8 4 Support for this position was found in Panas v. N.J. NaturalGas Co. 85 In Panas, the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld a jury charge that the defendant's act
need only be a proximate cause of the injury, not the proximate
cause. 86 The court in Freund, however, distinguished Panas on the
facts, noting that in Panas there was only one defendant. A concurrent negligence charge would not, therefore, have affected the out-

That may not even be possible in all circumstances. You must bear in mind the

circumstances.
Id. at 243 n.4, 432 A.2d at 932 n.4.
75 Id. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
7 Id. at 244, 432 A.2d at 932-33.
7Id.
71 Id., 432 A.2d at 933.
7( Id.
'1

Id. at 245, 432 A.2d at 933.

Id. Although the court recognized that a determination of the issue of concurrent negligence was not necessary in light of the decision to remand the case, it discussed the issue "to
clarify the point for the benefit of the parties and the trial judge." Id.
Id. at 245, 432 A.2d at 933.
I'
s'See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
87 N.J. at 246, 432 A.2d at 933.
8'58 N.J. 255, 281 A.2d 520 (1971).
8I Id. at 259, 281 A.2d at 522.
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come of the case. 87 The court concluded that "'in situations where the
conduct of more than one tortfeasor is implicated in the causation of
an accident, a charge based on concurrent negligence, as reflected in
the model jury charge, should be given, particularly when re-

quested." 88
In a concurring opinion, 89 Justice Clifford limited himself to
state, as he had done more fully in the Suter case,90 that the "'defective
condition unreasonably dangerous" standard put forth in section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts was the correct one. 9 1 Justice
Clifford protested that in Freund, as in Suter, the majority, which
looked at the conduct of the manufacturer rather than the product
itself, misconstrued "the risk-utility ingredient of its strict-liability in
tort analysis."'92 To support this position, he listed numerous cases
03
from other jurisdictions which expressly adopted section 402A.
The theory of strict liability in tort was formulated by the courts
when it became evident that negligence and warranty actions no
longer met the needs of the injured consumer in his quest for recovery. 94 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,95 the Supreme Court of
California adopted the strict liability in tort concept in a defective
products case stating that "a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
' 96
injury to a human being."

247, 932 A.2d at 934.
Id. The model charge reads as follows:

87 87 N.J. at

When the negligence of two or more persons combines to produce an injury and
damages to the plaintiff, the parties concurring in such negligence and bringing
about the result are jointly and severally liable for the injury and damages proximately caused thereby, regardless of the degree of their negligent participation.
Id. at 246, 432 A.2d at 933.
89 Id. at 248, 432 A.2d at 934 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford was joined by Justice
Sullivan in this opinion.
1o 81 N.J. at 178, 406 A.2d at 154 (Clifford, J., concurring).
91 87 N.J. at 248, 432 A.2d at 935 (Clifford, J., concurring).
92 Id. In Suter, Justice Clifford demonstrated how in his view the majority had linked the
proofs required in defective design cases to the conduct of the manufacturer while they should
only relate to the product itself. 81 N.J. at 180-81, 406 A.2d at 155 (Clifford, J., concurring).
93 87 N.J. at 249-50, 432 A.2d at 935-36 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford had
actually started this list in the Suter case. 81 N.J. at 191-91, 406 A.2d at 161 (Clifford, J.,
concurring).
04 See Birnbaum, supra note 59, at 596. Professor Birnbaum sees economic and social
considerations as furnishing a rational basis for the doctrine of strict liability: manufacturers are
in a better position to eliminate the risks created by defective products and they can better
shoulder the cost of injuries resulting from such products. Id.
- 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
96 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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NOTES

Since the Greenman decision, courts have struggled with the

concept of defect, especially in the areas of design defect and inadequate warning, and have continued to use negligence and warranty
language to describe the term. 97 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
first considered the issue in Cepeda. In Cepeda, the plaintiff lost four
fingers while operating a pelletizing machine and sued the manufacturer for negligence and breach of warranty.9 8 Using the theory of
strict liability the court carefully distinguished manufacturing defects
from design defects 9 and adopted the "defective condition unreason-

ably dangerous" language of section 402A of the Second Restatement
of Torts as a standard for design defects. 0 0 Although the court
focused upon whether the manufacturer acted reasonably under the
circumstances, it drastically departed from a traditional negligence
approach by imputing knowledge of the product's dangerousness to
the manufacturer.' 0 ' The following year the Suter court reconsidered
the question of strict liability for defective design cases and modified
the standard adopted in Cepeda. The Suter court rejected the Cepeda
analysis in favor of a strict liability charge given in terms of reasonable
fitness, suitability and safety.10 2 The opinion identified two categories of design defect and established what was described by one commentator as "a rather muddled variation of the test put forth in Barker

v. Lull Engineering Company. "103
In Barker, the Supreme Court of California established a twoprong test for design defect cases. First, a product could be defective if
it failed to meet the expectations of an ordinary consumer. 0 4 In the

alternative, it could be defective if the consumer proved that the
design was the proximate cause of his injury and the manufacturer
failed to establish that the benefit of such design outweighed its

risk. 05 In Suter the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished be,487 N.J. at 436-37, 432 A.2d at 929. See Birnbaum, .s51pra note 59, at 599. Professor
Birnbaum explains the problem as follows: Much of the confusion that continues to plague courts
in applying the doctrine of strict liability products liability can be traced to the dual legacy of
Greenman on the one hand, with its singularly bald notion of product defect, and section 402A
on the other, with its amorphous terminology. Id.
76 N.J. at 160. 386 A.2d at 820.
Id. at 169, 386 A.2d at 824. The court defined a manufacturing defect as a "variance,
latent or patent, from the manufacturer's intent," and a design defect as a condition "'where the
product is made as intended, but is asserted to be dangerous in some way." Id.
'- Id. at 171-72, 386 A.2d at 825.
I" at 163, 386 A.2d at 821.
Id.
" Id. at 174, 406 A.2d at 152. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
', Birnbaum, supra note 62, at 624. 20 Cal.3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
"" 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
Id. For a critical analysis of this decision, see Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controvcr.sy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63
MINMN. L. REv. 773, 782-96 (1979).
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tween self-evident design defects and non-self-evident ones. 0 6 The
first category of defects would be judged in terms of reasonable consumer expectations while the second group, which existed in the
absence of such expectations, would be evaluated in terms of whether
the manufacturer acted negligently. 0 7 Although the court illustrated
its concept of a self-evident defect, the court failed to provide a similar
description for non-self-evident defects, thus, leaving that term open
for interpretation. 08 This distinction was attacked by Justice Clifford who qualified it as "a mixture of the apples of warranty with the
oranges of negligence." 109
In Freund, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted a strict
liability standard for inadequate warning cases. "10 Although it recognized that strict liability is product-oriented,"' the court injected
conduct-oriented elements into its analysis. The court stated that the
jury would have to be instructed in terms of safety, "the predominant
factor in determining the adequacy of the manufacturer's efforts,- 112
and that the charge must make clear that a manufacturer which sold
its product without an adequate warning "has not satisfied its duty to
warn."' 3 Arguably, once the knowledge of the product's dangerousness is imputed to the manufacturer, as it was in Freund,"14 it does not
matter whether the trier of fact looks at the product" 5 or at the
conduct" 6 of the manufacturer." 7 Nevertheless, because the Freund
court set out to formulate a strict liability test, it would appear that
Justice Clifford's position in favor of the "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" standard I'a would have provided a better solution
since a manufacturer would be "subject to strict liability for personal

10881 N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
N.J. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150.
Id. To illustrate a self-evident defect, the majority gave as an example "'a bicycle whose
brakes did not hold because of an improper design." Id.
107 81
308

109 Id. at 184, 406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J., concurring).
13087 N.J. at 240-41, 432 A.2d at 931.
"I Id. at 238, 432 A.2d at 929.
332 Id. at 242, 432 A.2d at 932.
"1 Id. at 243, 432 A.2d at 932.
114

Id.

The Suter court advocated this approach in cases of self-evident defects. 81 N.J. at 171, 406
A.2d at 150.
"1

116The Suter court took this view in cases of non-self-evident defects, 81 N.J. at 171, 406 A.2d
at 150. This view was expanded upon in Freund. 87 N.J. at 241-43, 432 A.2d at 931-32.
137 The Supreme Court of Oregon explained that "the two standards are the same because a
seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes
he is purchasing." Phillips, 269 Or. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037.
318 See note 4 supra.
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injury caused by its product if plaintiff proves that the injury was
caused by a defective condition in the product that rendered it unreasonably dangerous for use." 1 1 9 By focusing on the product, this approach is more in line with the product-oriented strict liability theory.
At the same time, it "encompass[es] in a general way a notion of
20
reasonable and prudent behavior on a manufacturer's part."
Another alternative, and perhaps the most appropriate, was advocated by the Arizona court of appeals in Brady v. Melody Homes
Manufacturer.'12 In Brady, a mobile home owner brought a products liability action against the home's manufacturer for the allegedly
defective design of the home which lacked smoke detectors and provided only one exit. 2 2 In deciding the case, the Arizona court
adopted a bifurcated test. The manufacturer would be held strictly
liable for defects that fell within the Restatement definition of "defective condition" and its objective standard of reasonable consumer
expectation. 2 3 On the other hand, a negligence standard would be
used for non-self evident defect cases in which the reasonable consumer expectation test did not apply. The manufacturer would incur
liability if it could have made a safer product, 24 and the trier of fact
would utilize a risk/utility test, which is effectively inseparable from a
25
consideration of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.
Since overtones of negligence are unavoidable when using a risk/
utility analysis, a similar approach could have been adopted by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey for inadequate warning cases. Self2
evident defects, defined in terms of consumer expectations in Suter,1
could be analyzed under a strict liability standard, whereas non-selfevident defects, including inadequate warnings, could undergo a negligence analysis.
To use a negligence standard in cases of inadequate warnings
would alleviate problems raised by the Freund decision regarding the
extent of the manufacturer's liability and the availability of contribu-

"9

87 N.J. at 248, 432 A.2d at 935.

120

81 N.J. at 181, 406 A.2d at 155.

121 Ariz. 2.53, 589 P.2d 896 (1978).
I= at 255, 589 P.2d at 898.
Id.
123 "Defective condition" is defined in the Restatement of Torts as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) Or Torrs § 402A, comment g (1965). "Unreasonably dangerous" is explained in
comment i as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer." Id., comment i.
124 121 Ariz. at 257-59, 589 P.2d at 900-02.
'2
121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902 (quoting Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 237).
'6 81 N.J. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150.
'2,
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tory or comparative negligence as a defense. Since a manufacturer is

imputed with knowledge of the dangerousness of the product, it could
be held liable for dangerous propensities not technologically discoverable when the product was marketed. 1 7 This point is important
when considered in the context of a risk/utility analysis which, as a

balancing test, should include all factors which reflect upon the manufacturer's decision to market the product. A manufacturer should not
be held liable, however, when it has no actual knowledge of the
product's dangerousness.
An area left unclear by the Freund court is the question of
contributory negligence. Under the defenses of contributory and comparative negligence, a plaintiff may be barred from recovery if he
knowingly and voluntarily assumes a risk of which he was aware. 128 In
Suter, the Supreme Court of New Jersey created an exception for cases
where the plaintiff is an employee. 29 In those cases contributory
negligence is unavailable as a defense because "an employee engaged
at his assigned task . .. has no meaningful choice."' 130 While the
Freund court failed to consider whether this exception is applicable to
the facts of Freund, it would appear that the Bexiga and Suter bar
against its application in the employment area is still applicable.
Application of the Suter exception in an inadequate warning case such
as Freund may be misplaced, however, since in such a case an employee could have a choice of abiding by the manufacturers warning
or ignoring it.
127 Birnbaum, supra note 59, at 622. For Professor Birnbaum, the liability is close to being
absolute. "[This] raises the question of whether there is any point short of the absurd at which
the manufacturer can be said to have reasonably discharged its duty not to expose users of its
product to unreasonable danger." Id. at 623.
128 In his treatise, Professor Prosser described contributory negligence as a defense "which
consists of proceeding voluntarily to encounter a known unreasonable danger and which tends to
overlap the defense of assumption of risk." W. Pnossma, HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF ToTrs § 102,
at 671 (4th ed. 1971). See also Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 45859, 212 A.2d 769, 783 (1965). New Jersey enacted a Comparative Negligence Act whereby:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained shall be diminished by the percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982).
12.181 N.J. at 167-68, 406 A.2d at 148. The Suter court stated: "We see no reason to depart
from Bexiga's elimination of contributory negligence where an employee is injured due to a
defect (whether design or otherwise) in an individual accident while using a machine for its
intended or foreseeable purposes." Id.
"3 Id. at 167, 406 A.2d at 148. In Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 402, 412, 290 A.2d
281, 286 (1972), the court stated that it would be anomalous to bar recovery on the grounds that
the plaintiff was negligent because the plaintiff's negligence "was the very eventuality the safety
devices were intended to guard against." Id.
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NOTES

The Freund court mentioned, but failed to discuss, the issue of
3
proofs.' 3' In Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories,1
2 the appellate

division noted that the proofs required in negligence and strict liabil34
ity actions for inadequate warning were identical. 33 Other courts,'
as well as several commentators, 35 have reached a similar conclusion.
The Freund court's reluctance to deal with the issue can be inter-

preted as indicating tacit approval of the Torsiello dictum since Torsiello was noted in the decision. Thus, assuming that proofs sufficient

to establish strict liability are sufficient to show
negligence, plaintiffs
36
bear the same burden under either theory.1
The real shortcoming of the Freund decision is the court's contin-

ued use of negligence terminology to describe what it purports to be a
strict liability tort. The Freund court points to consumer protection as
a reason for the application of strict liability in inadequate warning
cases. 1 37 This argument does not carry the weight it formerly did. 3
Under the bifurcated Brady analysis advocated above, 39 consumers
would still be protected and manufacturers would know with more

certitude what is expected of them. In addition, courts would be able
to charge juries with clear instructions, thus avoiding the unsavory
position of mixing legal theories.
Nathalie Berger
13 87 N.J. at 240, 432 A.2d at 930.
"2 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (App. Div.), certif. denied. 81 N.J. 50, 404 A.2d 1150
(1979).
"I Id. at 320 n.2, 398 A.2d at 137 n.2.
131See. e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992 (8th Cir. 1969) (both negligence and strict liability standards applicable to case of inadequate warning); Rainbow v. Albert
Elia Bldg. Co., 49 A.D.2d 2.50, 253, 373 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930-31 (1975) (same proofs required in
negligence and strict liability causes of action).
"11 See Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325, 325
(1971); Wade, supra note 49, at 836-37.
""
See Birnbaum, supra note 59, at 648. Professor Birnbaum states that plaintiffs not only
have ample opportunity to get to the information needed to show the manufacturer's negligence,
but they already come forward with this information in strict liability actions. Id.
"'
87 N.J. at 240, 432 A.2d at 931. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
'3 Professor Birnbaum states: "The time has come to ask candidly whether some courts, in
their eagerness to provide recovery for injured plaintiffs, have not over zealously emphasized and
relied upon the risk-spreading rationale of strict products liability with a resultant abandonment
of any serious consideration of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct, which is the
very essence of a system of tort recovery." Birnbaum, supra note 59, at 643.
' See notes 121-27 .supraand accompanying text.

